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This paper, relying on a conceptualization of economic freedom in terms ofkinds of government actions, 
develops a new measure of economic freedom. However, this is not art for art's sake; instead, it allows 
us to provide an explanation for how particular institutions of economic freedom enhance economic 
development, a view upon which scholars agree. We develop two concepts related to economic freedom, 
namely the freedom-compatible and freedom-non-compatible institutions and use them as tools in an 
analysis ofthe process of economic growth, especially the relationship between economic freedom and 
long-run income. The major argument is that freedom-compatible institutions are primary determinants 
ofincome, while freedom-non-compatible institutions depend upon them and are partly the outcomes of 
the growth process itself, a fact which is explained by the Misesian theory ofinterventionism. Our regression 
analyses support our theoretical insights. 
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Since Adam Smith who explicitly raised the importance of system of natural liberty1 
(in modern parlance economic freedom), the issue of economic freedom has been a 
subject of little interest among economists, except for Hayek (1960); but during the past 
decade the concept of economic freedom has attracted more attention. This is due to the 
emergence of indexes2 ranking countries according to a scale running from the least free 
to the freest. The reason why more attention is paid to economic freedom is that various 
studies applying continually improving databases and constantly developing econometric 
techniques including two-stage regressions, extrémé bound analysis, Granger-causality, 
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' where "[e]very man, as long as he does not violate the laws ofjustice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest 
his own way, and to faring both his industry and capital into competition with those ofany other man, or order ofmen" 
(Smith 1776, Book Four, ChapterIX). See http://www.adamsmith.org/smith/won-b4-c9.htm. AccessedMay 15,2009. 
2
 These indexes are: the one developed by the Fraser Institute (Economic Freedom ofthe World Index; for the mostrecent 
version see Cwartney and Lawson 2009), and another constructed by the Heritage Foundation jointly with the Wall 
Street Journal (Index of Economic Freedom; for the most recent version see Miller and Holmes 2009). 
etc, have shown that economic freedom raises long-run income or growth (Easton and 
Walker 1997, DeHaan andSturm 2000, Sturm and De Haan 2001, Gwartney, Holcombe and 
Lawson 2004, 2006).3 But beyond the simple fact that economic freedom or the change in 
economic freedom positively affects growth, several details regarding this effect remained 
undiscovered. 
However, despite the existence of the economic freedom indexes and their extensive 
use in various empirical investigations, a theory of economic freedom itself is still 
missing, including an explanation of how it leads to economic growth/higher income.4 
Put differently, an underlying theory has not been included in the understanding of 
economic freedom developed by both the Fraser Institute and the Heritage Foundation. 
We think the root of the above shortcoming can be found in the way the indexes measuring 
economic freedom were constructed: the construction was largely driven by operational 
and measurement considerations (see Block 2006), rather than a theoretical concept-driven 
method.5 This is not to say that the indexes are not grounded on clear concepts, on the 
contrary; the EFW Index for example was developed as a result of a series of conferences 
in which many distinguished scholars, including Nobel Laureates, participated. Scholars at 
these conferences discussed thoroughly what should be integrated into an index measuring 
economic freedom. In this way, the concept of economic freedom embodied in the EFW 
Index they developed is a comprehensive concept, meaning that economic freedom is a 
sum of various factors. The problem inherent in adopting this methodology is that the 
list of the constituent elements can easily be questioned, as indeed is the case with the 
EFW Index: numerous scholars argued that particular components should be or should 
not be included in the index or disagreed about how much weight they should be given 
(see for instance De Haan and Sturm 2000, Heckelman and Stroup 2000, 2002). Thus, 
theoretical concepts should ideally stand alone, i.e., in their own right, rather than being 
a sum of numerous factors. In this spirit, elsewhere (Czeglédi and Kapás 2009) we have 
already proposed an opposite method of proceeding; that is to first develop a conceptual 
framework, and measure only after. 
In this paper we will take somé initial steps in the direction to reveal economic freedom's 
growth-enhancing mechanism. We will argue that the relationship between long-run 
income/growth and economic freedom is more complicated than a simple positive 
relationship between an exogenous economic freedom measure and the resulting per capita 
income. On the basis of the above considerations, we propose to rely on a conceptually-
driven framework based on the Hayekian notion of freedom developed elsewhere (Czeglédi 
and Kapás 2009). Here we will briefly summarize the outlines of this framework, and within 
this framework, we will construct our own measure of economic freedom. Our aim is not 
to simply propose an alternative measure art for art's sake; instead it is to demonstrate 
that our measure provides us with a better understanding of the process of how economic 
freedom affects growth. 
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 For a detailed overview ofthe empirical literature on economic freedom see Czeglédi and Kapás (2009). 
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 As McCloskey (1999:119) put it, [t]he deepest source ofthe trouble is that we do not know the connections between 
free economic institutions... and the flowering of humán ingenuity. Not really. We have ideological faiths about it, but 
wedonot scientifically know." 
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 Itmay come as a surprise that De Haan and Sturm (2000), who are leading scholars in empirical investigations on the 
effect of economic freedom, alsó lack a clear definition ofwhat is meant by economic freedom. 
Our new measure of economic freedom consists of two parts, namely freedom-compatible 
and freedom-non-compatible institutions and we will use them as tools in an analysis of the 
process of economic growth. The major argument is that freedom-compatible institutions 
are primary determinants of long-run income, while freedom-non-compatible institutions 
depend upon them and are partly the outcomes of the growth process itself, a fact which is 
explained by the Misesian theory of interventionism. Our regression analyses support our 
theoretical insights. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we will briefly summarize 
our conceptual framework of economic freedom, and based on that, we will operationalize 
it. Then we will carry out regression analyses with our own measure in order to investigate 
how economic freedom affects growth. The fmal section concludes. 
From theory to measurement 
A theoretical framework 
Elsewhere (Czeglédi and Kapás 2009) when developing a theoretical framework of economic 
freedom we argued for the usefulness of the Hayekian notion of freedom. Here our major 
argument was that since economic freedom and government are not antagonistic per se -
lesson we drawn from the Scottish philosophers such as Locke (1690) and Hume (1739), and 
Hayek (1960) - but at the same time government represents the major threat to economic 
freedom, economic freedom is best conceptualized in terms of types of government actions. 
As suggested by the idea of "limited government" of the above scholars, government 
per se is not to be condemned, unlike the view which is to a certain extent suggested by 
the indexes of economic freedom6; instead, it fulfills somé positive roles that cannot be 
fulfilled by any other actor in a society. Thus, our argument is that economic freedom is 
compatible with government, but not with any kind of government. Clearly, when it comes 
to economic freedom it is not the size of the government that matters, as is alsó argued by 
Hayek (1960) and Mises (1949:279-287), but rather what government is allowed to do and 
how, accordingly, economic freedom relates to the character of government actions, rather 
than the volume of government actions (see Hayek 1960). 
Based on the above considerations, when it comes to economic freedom, one has to 
analyze the kinds (character) of government actions. Government actions can be categorized 
as coercive and non-coercive actions. In a society organized as a state, individuals must 
tolerate somé coercion - because "without somé sort of state coercion, the very ability to 
autonomously pursue our projects and plans seems impossible" (Blake 2001:280) - , namely 
that of the state which protects us from the coercion of others: "As far as the government 
... confines the exercise of its violence and the threat of such violence to the suppression 
and prevention of antisocial action, there prevails what reasonably and meaningfully is 
called liberty" (Mises 1949:281). Nevertheless, a paradox is that the only means whereby the 
state can prevent the coercion of one individual by another is the very threat of coercion. 
Accordingly, freedom does not mean a totál absence of coercion but the only acceptable 
end to which government can use its coercive power is to protect us from priváté coercion. 
6
 In this respect note that the Heritage Foundation's index treats zero government spending as the ideál levél, that is, 
government (spending) is seen as contradictory per se to economic freedom. 
Economic freedom should be thought of as a value on a continuum: under perfect economic 
freedom state coercion concerning individuals' entrepreneurial activities cannot go beyond 
certain limits, and the only acceptable means is enforcing generál abstract rules known 
beforehand, where rules are understood in terms of the rule of law.7 Thus the principle that 
provides us with a criterion according to which we can evaluate economic freedom is the 
rule of law. In this spirit, a deviation from the ideál of the rule of law reduces economic 
freedom. When seeing the ideál of the rule of law as the maximum of economic freedom we 
think of the rule of law as the container holding a set of formai institutions such as secure 
priváté property rights, an independent judiciary, a constitution, freedom of contract, etc, 
the better "quality" of which enhances economic freedom. Clearly these institutions are 
related to coercive governmental actions, but they are necessary for the functioning of the 
markét because they allow individuals to plan their affairs with reasonable confidence that 
they can know in advance the legal consequences of various actions. That is why we call 
them freedom-compatible institutions.8 
Furthermore, for our understanding of economic freedom, another aspect of the rule 
of law is alsó important, namely that the rule of law is associated with form, not substance, 
and implies that constitutional decision-making should be cast in the form of rules, which 
reflects the assumption that clear and determinate rules are necessary for both citizens and 
those in power.9 In sum, what is emphasized in the above conceptualization of the rule of 
law is government's reliance on generál abstract rules known beforehand.10 
However, beside freedom-compatible government actions there are those that harm 
economic freedom. These include all kinds of controls such as price, quantity and wage 
control. Clearly, these coercive activities of the government represent the kind of infringement 
of the individuals priváté sphere which is an obstacle to individuals freely contracting with 
each others. So do, beside these regulations, all kinds of government monopolies for those 
goods and services which could be otherwise provided on a competitive basis. On potentially 
competitive markets, the services or goods should be supplied by the government on the same 
terms as anybody else, otherwise economic freedom is hurt. The third type of freedom-non-
compatible coercive activities is government subsidies to particular firms (priváté or state) 
and various transfers which arbitrarily differentiate between agents. Transfers and subsidies 
should be seen as coercive actions because those who get particular subsidies are forced to 
behave not according to their plans but according to the government's will (Hayek 1960). 
Measurement considerations 
As for the measurement of economic freedom, we should keep in mind that freedom 
understood as the absence of coercion is defined "negatively". So in fact, what one has to 
measure is the absence of that coercion which relates to individuals' entrepreneurial acts. 
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 "Freedom demands no more than that coercion and violence, fraud and deception, be prevented, except for the use of 
coercion by the government for the sole purpose of enforcing known rules intended to secure the best conditions under 
which the individual may g/Ve his activities a coherent, rationalpattern" (Hayek 1960:144). 
8
 These institutions are the outcomes of government actions conforming to the rule oflaw. 
9
 Foran overviewofthe various ideál types ofthe rule oflaw see Falion (1997). 
"When we obey laws, in the sense of generál abstract rules laid down irrespective of their application to us, we are not 
subject to another man's will and are therefore free" (Hayek 1960:153), and "[s]uch a system is likelyto beachieved and 
maintained only ifall authority is limited in the exercise of coercive power by generál principles" (Hayek 1973:55). 
We argue that a possible fruitful way is precisely to measure economic freedom in the same 
(negative) way as it is defined. This implies that we have to measure those governmental 
actions that reduce economic freedom, and since non-coercive government activities by 
defmition do not hurt economic freedom, we should focus our attention only on coercive 
activities. Our framework suggests that the extent of economic freedom can be reduced 
from two sides: (1) by the deviation from an ideál of the rule of law (freedom-compatible 
government activities), and (2) by freedom-non-compatible government activities. 
Of course, the character of government actions (either freedom-compatible or freedom-
non-compatible) itself is not measurable; accordingly we have to give practical meaning 
to it. As far as the freedom-compatible actions are concerned, based on our theory, we 
express them in terms of the institutions of the rule of law. As for the freedom-non-
compatible actions, the precise identification of these actions, namely controls, government 
monopolies in potentially competitive markets, and transfers and subsidies gives them 
practical meaning, These can be seen as regulatory institutions providing relatively stable 
rules constraining actors' entrepreneurial activities. 
We do not use somé generally accepted index of the rule of law because, on the one 
hand, these indexes are usually not transparent, and it is not clear which facts or data 
are taken into consideration when they are constructed. On the other hand, we want to 
measure the rule of law in a different way, which is more in line with our theory. This 
consists in measuring the "distance" from the ideál of the rule of law instead of measuring 
the constituting institutions of the rule of law that are aggregated into one measure. To 
be more precise, as for the freedom-compatible activities, what is to be measured is thus 
whether when acting, government relies only on rules laid down beforehand because, as 
argued before, under perfect economic freedom (ideally) the government must rely only on 
rules laid down beforehand. However, on the other hand, it is equally important to know 
whether and to what extent rules, once they exist, are followed in practice. This latter point 
is important because rules should not necessarily be codified; thus formai rules are not 
enough for us to decidé whether an economy can be said to be governed according to the 
rule of law. We alsó need defacto practice, and in addition, we need defacto practice even 
if, as an extrémé case, a country does not have any written rules. Here the problem we face 
is that written rules do not necessarily become effective constraints. 
Clearly, here two aspects of the way governmental actions are taken are intertwined. The 
first aspect concerns whether the government relies on rules when acting, since coercion is 
admissible only when it conforms to generál rules and not when it is a means of achieving 
a particular aim of current policy. The second aspect relates to the extent to which the 
government is committed to follow the rules that it itself laid down beforehand. Thus one 
can imagine such a situation in which de iure the government is bound to rules, i.e., in 
principle it relies on rules, but in practice it does not keep to these rules in every respect. 
We argue that these two aspects can be proxied, on the one hand, in the context of legal 
procedures, and on the other hand, in that of corruption. 
As far as the legal procedures are concerned, we have to examine whether the 
government is in fact forced by any independent authority (such as the supreme court or the 
constitutional court). This is analyzed under the rubric of "judicial independence" by Veid 
and Voigt (2003), and Hayo and Voigt (2007) 1 1 . These scholars argue for a differentiation 
'' They see the highest court as representing the whole judicial system. 
between defacto and de iure judicial independence. As regards the formai independence of 
the highest court, they examine, on the one hand, those procedures and formai rules that 
make the judges independent from the government, and on the other hand, the importance 
of the highest court and the decisions it takes and the effects it has on society. Since a de 
facto index measures whether the rules become practice, it may be used as a proxy for to 
what extent the government relies on rules when acting. 
Another aspect we propose to take into account as regards legal procedures concerns 
legal formalism. In their article Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2003) 
construct an "index of formalism" by which they intend to measure the extent to which the 
way legal disputes should be resolved is determined or regulated by the law. It is clear that 
our ideál ofthe rule of law is not the same as the ideál of their neighbor model12, but several 
aspects of the latter can be used as a proxy for the former. So we use those components 
of the sub-indexes (dummy variables) of Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 
(2003) that can arguably be used as components of a rule of law measure, since they refer to 
the generality, or the certainty or the equality of the law.13 
As mentioned above, we think that the levél of corruption is alsó a good proxy of the 
quality of the rule of law in a country. Although corruption is often used as a description 
of bureaucratic or institutional quality (Paldam and Gundlach 2008), using corruption as 
a component of economic freedom is not an evident choice. So we have to explore how 
corruption relates to economic freedom in our theoretical approach. 
When it comes to understanding corruption it is useful to start with the widespread 
definition of the concept according to which corruption is "the misuse of public office for 
priváté gain" (Svensson 2005:20, Bardhan 2006:341), or in more concrete terms, "corruption 
takes place when public ofhcials break the law in pursuit of their priváté interest" (Khan 
2006:216), or somewhat more generally, corruption is the "illicit use of willingness to pay 
as a decision making criterion" (Rose-Ackermann 2006:xvii). As a step forward, Hodgson 
and fiang (2007) extend the definition of corruption in a way to include priváté corruption, 
too. At the end of the day all defmitions revolve around the idea that corruption means 
circumventing certain rules that someone else would consider would be useful if all parties 
followed them. One determining factor behind this rule-following is whether the rules 
are in line with the players' morál or value systems (Hodgson and Jiang 2007). Another 
factor is the efficiency of the enforcement by the state (Bardhan 1997). This is what provides 
the crucial importance of corruption from our viewpoint, since we have emphasized that 
economic freedom requires that the government abide by rules. 
But the question still remains to what extent corruption can be seen as a sign of deviation 
from the rules (the rule of law) that assure economic freedom, since not every rule that is 
enforced is the basis of economic freedom. Rules or laws can be laid down arbitrarily and 
enforced by coercion even if they favor only those in power. Of course, circumventing these 
kinds of rules can hardly be considered an infringement on economic freedom, since it 
was the enactment of the rule itself that infringed freedom. Violation of the rules can only 
mean a reduction of economic freedom if the rules that are circumvented are those that 
" What Djankov et al. (2003) have in mind as a benchmark is the "neighbor model" resolution ofa dispute. This model 
is the "resolution of a dispute among two neighbors by a third party, guided by common sense and customs. Such 
resolution does not rely on formai law and does not circumscribe the procedures that the neighbors employ to address 
their differences" (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 2003:457). 
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 For the exact description of which sub-components we included in our measure, see Appendix A. 
were förmed to limit state power or to make it possible for the state to apply the rule oflaw. 
In sum, violating the rules hurts economic freedom if the government itself respects the 
rule oflaw. 
It is usual to differentiate between "petty" and "grand" corruption, as does Rose-
Ackerman (2006, pp. xvii-xxi). Essentially, petty corruption refers to the acts of bureaucrats 
who breach the rules in an environment where the rule oflaw is respected in generál, while 
grand corruption occurs when the government creates rules to be able to collect bribes. 
This is what for us rescues the concept of corruption from vagueness, since in this latter 
case, it is the government that is "corrupt", not the players who are trying to avoid these 
governmental actions. 
To sum up, economists' understanding of corruption is in line with our understanding of 
the freedom-compatible activities of government, because it is a reflection of whether the 
government or the players follow the rules.14 All in all, corruption is one crucial symptom 
of the absence of economic freedom, because just like economic freedom, corruption can 
result from the fact that government is too weak as well as from the fact that government 
is too strong. If government is too weak, it cannot prevent its bureaucrats becoming 
corrupt, which is paralleled with the generál idea that a government is necessary to secure 
priváté property. If government is too strong, Le., when it is not limited, it can become an 
organization for corruption, which can be paralleled with the generál idea that government 
can easily violate the rules of priváté property. Corruption reflects the absence of following 
the rules by either the bureaucrats and the priváté players who cooperate with them, or 
by the whole structure of the government. Note however, that its measurement is made 
difficult by several factors including its qualitative rather than quantitative nature (see 
Kaufmann et al. 2003, 2006). 
To sum up, as a deviation from the ideál of the rule of law we propose to take into 
account, on the one hand, the legal procedures which reflect whether the legal system as 
a whole meets the requirements of the equality, generality and certainty of the law, and 
on the other hand, the corruption which reflects a departure from the reliance on and 
commitment to rules (rule-following). 
Besides the deviation from the ideál of the rule of law, freedom-non-compatible 
government activities hurt economic freedom, too. Based on the above-said, we argue that 
economic freedom can be reduced in three respects in this field. First, all price, quantity and 
wage controls reduce economic freedom. Second, government monopolies in potentially 
competitive areas alsó reduce it. And fmally when government subsidizes particular firms 
or gives transfers, this is alsó against economic freedom. 
What is the most problematic issue of these three is the state monopoly in potentially 
competitive markets because not every kind of state ownership reduces economic freedom. 
State ownership can reduce economic freedom only if it goes together with a monopoly in 
potentially competitive markets. Thus it is not enough to have a measure of state-owned 
enterprises; we need to have a measure related to their monopoly power in potentially 
competitive markets. Accordingly, we measure here state ownership together with those 
regulatory burdens that reduce competition. 
" In addition to what has been said so far on the usefulness of the concept of corruption in our understanding of 
economic freedom, note that Shleifer and Vishny's (1993) model of corruption alsó supports our view. 
All things considered, we think that measuring freedom-non-compatible activities is 
much less troublesome than measuring freedom-compatible activities. Thanks to the 
increasing attention devoted to the subject of regulation there are relatively well-known 
and widely used databases for this purpose, such as that compiled by the Doing Business 
project of the World Bank, and somé components of the two economic freedom indexes 
can alsó be used.15 
We have constructed our own measure which we call "economic freedom measure" 
(EFM) based on the above theoretical considerations (see Appendix A and B). 
Regression analysis with the EFM 
In what follows we will carry out empirical investigations to show that in somé respects our 
economic freedom measure behaves similarly to the other indexes of economic freedom 
used in the literature, but in addition this analysis allows us to draw conclusions which the 
other indexes exclude. Particularly, we will try to show that the relationship between long-
run income and economic freedom is more complicated than a simple positive relationship 
between an exogenous economic freedom measure and the resulting per capita income. The 
two concepts related to economic freedom, namely the freedom-compatible and freedom-
non-compatible institutions we developed, can be seen as tools that help us analyze the 
process of economic growth. 
In this spirit, we will investigate the economic freedom - long-run income relationship 
in three respects. First, in section 3.2 we will do the same analysis as that of the literature, 
but we will use our EFM measure instead of the EFW index. Our aim here is to show that 
the results with the new measure are not qualitatively different. Second, in section 3.3, 
we will show that the freedom-compatible institutions are primary determinants of long-
run income, and are exogenous. However, the freedom-non-compatible institutions do not 
seem to play an important role in determining income. Consequently, in section 3.4, we 
will investigate the reasons for this, and our response will be that the endogenous nature 
of state interventions in economic development makes the overall effect of freedom-non-
compatible activities insignificant. From a theoretical perspective we will argue that the 
apparent absence of any effect of freedom-non-compatible institutions can be understood 
by referring to the theory of interventionism in the mixed economy. 
The model, data, and sample 
Here, following the literature (e.g., Easton and Walker 1997, Heitger 2004) we will include 
our economic freedom measure into the humán capital-augmented Solow-model (Mankiw 
et al. 1992). Using the well-known conditional convergence argument (Mankiw et al 
1992:421-424, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2003:59-61), this breaks down to a testable equation 
in the following form: 
\n(GDP per capita} = const + y] ln(/ / GDP)Í + y 2 \n{school),. + y 3 ln(«, + g + ő) + 
+ Yi ]R{EFM\ + el 
15
 It must be noted here that the most recent version ofthe two economic freedom indexes are already making use ofthe 
Doing Business data (Gwartney and Lawson 2008, Holmes et al. 2008). 
The variables refer to the following: l/GDP is the share of investment within GDP, school is 
the average years of schooling, n is the average growth of the labor force, while EFM is the 
economic freedom measure, e. is the error term. In addition, g+S is assumed to be 0.05 as 
in Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). 
Our source for GDP per capita, investment and population is the Penn World Table of 
Heston, Summers andAten (2006). More precisely it is real GDP data based on purchasing 
power parity and a chain-link method, the growth of the labor force (computed from data 
on labor force and GDP per worker)1 6, and investment rates that we used from Heston 
Summers and Aten (2006). Investment in humán capital, for data availability reasons, is 
proxied by the average years of schooling instead of secondary schooling years between 
1980 and 2000 in the whole population beyond the age of fifteen from Barro and Lee 
(2001) 1 7 . EFM is constructed from different sources and with the method described in the 
previous section and in Appendix A 1 8. 
Investment variables are averages between the years 1980 and 2003, while GDP per 
capita is measured in 2003. The bottleneck data that reduce our sample are the data on 
judicial independence form Hayo and Voigt (2003). All in all, we have 45 countries19 that 
can be described with the variables we used to measure economic freedom together with 
the variables of economic development. 
The effect and exogeneity of economic freedom 
The OLS regression shows (Table 1, column 1) that the EFM is statistically significant when 
controlling for physical and humán capital investment and population growth. As the 
coefficient of the EFM indicates, a one percent increase in the economic freedom measure 
would cause a more than a one percent increase in long-run income. This effect is larger 
than two of the other three factors affecting income. Our result is not very different from 
the conclusion of the literature examining the effect of economic freedom as measured by 
the EFW index on income or growth (e.g., Easton and Walker 1997, De Haan and Sturm 
2000). 
We alsó investigated the exogeneity of economic freedom. We accept the argument of 
Acemoglu (2005:1040-1041), according to which the first stage regression needs a theoretical 
explanation: one must have somé theoretical reasons to choose a particular instrument, 
and the technical conditions (as regards the correlation of the instruments) are not enough. 
Appropriate instruments can possibly be found among those variables that affected the 
evolution of the law. The reason behind that is that the rule of law is a crucial concept in 
our understanding of economic freedom which is, to a large extent, rooted in the history 
of a country. Thus it seems obvious to use as an instrument the legal origin of a country. In 
'
6
 The only exception is Taiwan in which case weuse the growth ofthe population because of the lack of GDP per worker 
data. As the participation rate is almost constant during the whole perlőd, this is only a minor discrepancy. 
17Available: http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html. 
18
 The data available to us is limited as regards which year the data we use originate from. Different databases we used 
provide data for different time spans and different country groups, and we had to make compromises in this respect. Our 
databasemust be refreshed and improved in the future, even ifthe institutional data we used do not change drastically 
over time. This constant nature particularly characterizes the institutional data embodied in our freedom-compatible 
measure, on the role of which we put great emphasis. 
"Although in Appendix B we have 47 countries, for the regression analysis as it is usual we dropped two oil exporting 
countries, Venezuela and Kuwait. 
addition, we chose certain variables of religion; expressing adherence to certain religions 
measured as a share of the population that can be associated with religion in generál (that 
is, the relatíve size of each religious group within the totál number of religiously-inclined 
people). Although the characteristics of the religious groups people belong to in a country 
may not affect the formai law, they certainly have an effect on informál institutions that 
characterize the defacto behaviour of the players; and the rule of law is a defacto category. 
However, since we have a considerable number of transition economies, we included a 
transition dummy in the set of instruments: there is no doubt that transition countries share 
common historical features.20 Furthermore, we alsó included the size of the population 
as an explanatory variable in the first stage regression21, a decision which can be justified 
based on what the rule of law means in our theory: the rule of law is a characteristic of the 
government's behaviour, something which is not only a matter of history. Whether the 
government will try to break the rules laid down beforehand and intervene in the economy 
by discretionary regulation is alsó determined by the political benefits and costs of this 
action. In our theoretical framework this intervention may lead to the establishment of 
new kinds of regulation which are freedom-non-compatible activities. But, on the other 
hand, this may alsó lead to a deviation from the rule of law: more regulation could mean 
more corruption, and if the government has the political incentives to intervene in an ad 
hoc way, it can hurt the independence of the courts. We rely on the argument provided by 
Mulligan and Shleifer (2005) who show theoretically and empirically that the political costs 
and benefits of regulation are determined in such a way that a larger population leads to 
more regulatory burdens ceteris paribus. This explains why we included population as an 
instrument. 
As shown in Table 1 all the religion variables, with the exception of the share of Jews, are 
significant and positive. It may seem to be strange that every religion variable has a positive 
effect. Note however, that these are only partial effects: for instance, the share of Muslims 
raises the levél of economic freedom, taking the other religion and other variables as given. 
This may show the effect of religiosity in generál, or that of a multireligional environment.22 
The transition dummy is alsó significant and negatíve as was expected. The population 
variable is alsó significant and has the expected sign. 
It alsó may be puzzling that only one of the legal origin dummies is significant (with the 
expected sign) - the effect of the Scandinavian legal origin is, we think, the result of the 
large welfare states in these countries - since a huge literature on legal origin (e.g., Botero et 
al. 2004, Djankov et al. 2002, La Porta et al. 2008) shows that legal origin has a considerable 
effect on different measures of regulation. We will try to solve this puzzle later in section 
3.4. 
We do not drop the insignificant variables because dropping them does not change the 
result, and in this way it is easier to compare the freedom-compatible and the freedom-non-
20
 There are nine transition countries in the sample: Bulgária, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Russia, and Slovenia. Note that our transition dummy is not identical to the socialist legal origin dummy, 
because the legal systems ofseveral transition (post-communist) countries originated before the socialist era. 
21
 The population variable is one tenth ofthe logarithm of the population (Population= Ln[numberofinhabitants]/10). 
Population data comes from Heston, Summers and Aten (2006) and are averaged over the years from 1980 to 2003. 
22
 Note what Voltaire writes in his "Letters on the English": "Ifone religion only were allowed in England, the Government 
would very possibly become arbitrary; if there werebut two, thepeople would cut one another's throats; butas thereare 
such a multitude, they all live happy and in peace". Available: http://www.bartleby.eom/34/2/6.html. Accessed May 15, 
2009. 
compatible explanatory variables. Using these eleven variables as instruments (see Table 1, 
column 2), the coefficients do not change to a great extent, as is corroborated formally by 
the omitted version of the Hausman test (Maddala 1992:510-513) (column 4), according to 
which the hypothesis of the exogeneity of economic freedom cannot be rejected at the usual 
significance levél, since the residual from the first stage regression does not prove to be a 
statistically significant (at a 10 percent levél) variable on the second stage. 
So far we have seen that economic freedom as measured by the EFM has an exogenous 
and positive effect on income even if one controls for other variables. In the following we 
will show that this new index helps us to point to a mechanism through which economic 
freedom may affect income - a mechanism that is excluded when using the two usual 
indexes of economic freedom, and consequently which does not appear as an explanatory 
factor in the empirical literature on economic freedom dealing with how economic freedom 
affects growth (e.g., Gwartney, Lawson, and Holcombe 2004, 2006). 
The analysis ofthe effects ofthe two main components of economic freedom 
As a refmement of the previous analysis we will take a step further and investigate the 
effects of the two main components of the EFM: freedom-compatible and freedom-non-
compatible measures. Here we hypothesize that freedom-non-compatible institutions are 
partly endogenous primarily because as freedom-compatible institutions become better, 
governments' incentives to apply freedom-non-compatible institutions will change, and 
they will tend to use more transfers and subsidies but less regulation on prices and quantities. 
Thus our conjuncture is that (1) freedom-compatible institutions are exogenous with a 
positive effect in the economic freedom-long-run income relationship, while (2) freedom-
non-compatible institutions are partly endogenous but their effect is indeterminate, 
because particular elements, according to our hypothesis, move together with income in 
different directions. The rest of this section will be devoted to examining the effects of the 
components while the next section will deal with the endogeneity of the freedom-non-
compatible institutions. 
Column 1 in Table 2 shows the results for the simple OLS regression with the usual 
variables and the two components of the economic freedom measure. The result is clear: the 
measure of freedom-compatible institutions is significant while the measure of freedom-
non-compatible institutions is not (p-value is 0.217) although it has a negatíve sign. Having 
obtained these results, we dropped the freedom-non-compatible measure and tested 
whether the freedom-compatible measure is exogenous, with an expectation that it is. 
Column 2 in Table 2 shows the results for a simple OLS regression in which we omitted the 
freedom-non-compatible measure. This specification is backed by the regained significance 
of population growth which should be expected based on a Solow-model. In column 3 we 
used the 2SLS method to estimate the same specification, by instrumenting the freedom-
compatible variable with the same variables we used above. Although the pure comparison 
of the coefficients of in columns 2 and 3 in Table 2 might be enough to conclude that the 
freedom-compatible measure is truly exogenous, we run the same formai test as above as 
well (for results see Table 3). 
We first run the first stage regression with the same variables we used for instrumenting 
the economic freedom measure above (column 1 in Table 3). More or less the same variables 
are significant as in the case of the economic freedom measure, with the notable exception 
that none of the legal origin variables is significant this time. This means that religion 
variables dominate in determining the freedom-compatible variable. 
It must be noted, however, that all religion variables have a positive sign again; meaning 
that given the share of other religion variables, a country with a higher levél of one religion 
variable is expected to have a higher levél of freedom-compatible institutions. As in the 
case of all regression results the question of causality arises; namely that those governments 
that behave in a freedom-compatible way will attract people of different religions to live 
there, or those living there will not be shy about expressing their faith. Maybe both types of 
causality are true, and these results express a form of the effect of a historical evolution. On 
the one hand, economic freedom is a result of historical evolution, in which the religious 
freedom ofthe rulers' subjects may have been one of the driving forces. On the other hand, 
according to the Hayek (1944[1971]) and Friedman (1962), once economic freedom is in 
place, it is a means of sustaining political and civil freedom, of which freedom of expression 
is not an insignificant element. But our aim here, which is to show the exogeneity of the 
freedom-compatible institutions, is independent of the types of causality. 
Column 2 in Table 3 shows the result for the test of exogeneity of the freedom-compatible 
variable. As is clear the residuals are highly insignificant (with a p-value of 0.848), which 
allows us to conclude that the freedom-compatible measure is exogenous in the economic 
freedom-long-run income relationship. To put it in a simple way, it is not wealth which 
makes government behave in a freedom-compatible way; rather historical-cultural factors 
play an important role in shaping freedom-compatible institutions. In addition, the effect 
of the freedom-compatible measure is comparable with humán and physical capital 
investment: a country with a ten percent higher quality of freedom-compatible institutions 
will have a 7.46 percent higher long-run income. 
The co-evolution of freedom-compatible and freedom-non-compatible institutions 
Above we found that the freedom-non-compatible institutions have a negatíve but 
insignificant effect on long-run income. How can we interpret the "behavior" of this 
variable? It is a compelling question because many argue (e.g., Djankov et al. 2002, Djankov, 
McLiesh and Ramalho 2006) that regulatory variables matter for growth and other welfare 
measures, which clearly opposes our result. Our argument here is that the insignificance 
of the freedom-non-compatible institutions is a result of the fact that they are partially 
endogenous and the endogenous effect has the opposite sign as compared to the exogenous 
one. 
More precisely, we propose that freedom-non-compatible institutions are partially 
shaped by the freedom-compatible ones, because "good" fundamental institutions cannot 
make an institutional structure consistent with the freedom-non-compatible ones, resulting 
from interventionism. This argument is based on the Misesian notion of interventionism. 
As elaborated by Míses (1940[1998], 1929[1996]) and Ikeda (1997:91-195) the process 
of interventionism accompanies the entrepreneurial markét process: interventionist acts 
are reactions to entrepreneurial acts. Any intervention into the markét process will lead 
to further interventions by which the government tries to cure the unintended effects of 
previous interventions. However, the spirál of interventions will reach a point at which 
the government must deregulate, otherwise "they [the governments] will find eventually 
that they have adopted socialism" (Mises 1940[1998]:91). What we are arguing is that the 
point at which the interventionist process has to stop and turn back and be followed by 
a deregulation process (Ikeda 1997:137-142) is dependent on the quality of the freedom-
compatible institutions. 
But the process of interventionism as analyzed by these authors is modeled in an 
environment with perfect markét institutions, that is, in an environment where the players 
follow the rules formulated by the regulators. To put it another way, the interventionist 
process is imagined in a world of perfect enforcement of the rules. When this is not the 
case, the unintended consequences of regulation that create demand for new regulation 
is less severe from the regulators' viewpoint. As a result, the unsustainable nature of the 
process is less evident. The conclusion is that the more secure the institutional condition of 
entrepreneurship is in a country, the sooner deregulation will come, since the unintended 
consequences originate from the entrepreneurial actions, which, in turn, are stimulated 
by freedom-compatible institutions. As a result, interventionism will be more extended in 
those countries which are more developed but whose freedom-compatible institutions are 
poorer. 
The above feature of the data is alsó demonstrated in Figure 1; a simple scatterplot 
between income and the freedom-non-compatible measure: the performances of countries 
with less freedom-non-compatible activities (a higher levél of the measure) are much more 
diverse than those of countries with more. Or to put it another way, when considering the 
levels of freedom-non-compatible activities, developed economies are much more diverse 
than developing countries. 
This feature again provides support for our hypothesis that the high levél of intervention 
has resulted from an interventionist process that is just the byproduct of the markét process, 
since it shows that rich countries have a high levél of freedom-non-compatible activities. Or 
to put it differently, there seems to be (from the evidence of these 45 countries) no countries 
with a low levél of freedom-non-compatible activities and low income. Our explanation 
for this fact is that there should be relatively sound freedom-compatible institutions in 
place to begin the road to an interventionist state, and only rich countries have these, 
since having them made them rich. Of course, we do not think that the interventionist 
process explanation is overwhelming. Even from Figure 1 it becomes clear that there are 
other variables in addition to GDP that are apparently needed to explain the diversity of 
freedom-non-compatible institutions, mainly among developed countries. Our data makes 
it possible for us to give somé more robust empirical corroboration of what we propose in 
this section. We ran a regression on the freedom-non-compatible measure (see Table 4). 
Besides the initial income (measured as GDP per capita in 1990) 2 3 and the freedom-
compatible measure we included the legal origin variables since they were insigniíicant 
in the regression on the freedom-compatible measure. This is aimed at minimizing the 
potential of a multicollinearity between the freedom-compatible institutions and the 
other explaining factors of the freedom-non-compatible institutions. We alsó included 
somé additional variables which may have an effect on what is captured by the freedom-
non-compatible institutions. Thus we added a variable to account for the ideology of the 
23
 Initial incomes are GDP per capita in 1990 except for those countries whose 1990 data are not available in Heston, 
Summers and Aten (2006). In these cases we used the f\rst year for which income data is provided. These are: Bulgária 
(1991), Georgia (1992), Lithuania (1993). 
government - the number of years during which the governing party has been left-wing'4. 
Ideology may shape a government's overall approach to economic policy and thus may have 
an effect on regulation and welfare transfers. We alsó added a variable that tries to express 
the levél of political freedom,25 to account for the effect of political institutions through 
median voter logic. 
Now our hypothesis seems to hold: initial income affects the freedom-non-compatible 
measure negatively while the freedom-compatible institutions affect it positively. That is, 
holding somé other historical-cultural features constant, those countries that have firmer 
freedom-compatible institutions apply less freedom-non-compatible regulations. The 
fact that this mechanism seems to work besides that which goes through legal origin is 
important because it suggests that the mechanism through which we explain the "behavior" 
of freedom-non-compatible institutions can be a complementary (not a substitute) of 
the legal-origin explanations elaborated in for example Djankov et ah (2002) or Botero 
et al. (2004). To put it simply, it is not only the legal origin that determines the levél of 
regulation but alsó whether the government is able to behave in a freedom compatible way 
by respecting and securing the rule of law. Although above, at least explicitly, we were not 
theorizing about the role of legal origin in shaping freedom-non-compatible institutions, 
the closely connected development of common law and federalism (Weingast 1995) enables 
us to explain this relationship. Thus the positive effect of English legal origin (which is 
equivalent to the negative sign of the other legal origins) may come from the market-
preserving federalist system of the Anglo-Saxon countries. 
The conclusion of this section is that a lower levél of freedom-non-compatible regulations 
can lead to higher income, but somé of its elements tend to move in step with economic 
development. These two effects together are responsible for the results we obtained before 
(Table 2); namely that the freedom-non-compatible measure is not significant. 
Furthermore, the regulatory authorities have incentives to go on building up freedom-
non-compatible institutions, while they alsó have somé incentives to let economic growth 
happen, a process which would require the elimination of these institutions. What we are 
proposing is that freedom-compatible institutions influence these incentives: the more 
secure they are the more evident and direct are the effects of the interventions. 
Conclusions 
The major conclusion we can draw is that the relationship between economic freedom and 
economic development is not simple, contrary to what is very often claimed in literature. 
Somé elements of economic freedom, namely freedom-compatible institutions, are shaped 
by factors outside the process of development, and they have a significant effect on long-
run income, and this effect is exogenous. On the other hand, somé elements, such as those 
we refer to as freedom-non-compatible institutions, seem to be the result of development 
itself, i.e., they are partly endogenous: as countries get richer, they are more prone to apply 
regulations that hurt freedom (transfers and subsidies), but they are alsó prone to eliminate 
24
 This variable comes from the Database of Political Institutions complied by Beck et al. (2001) and is available at http:// 
econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20649465~pagePK:642i4825~piPK:64 
2i4943~theSitePK:469382,00.html 
25
 The source ofthis variable is Freedom House (2007). "Political rights'is the average ofthe same variable ofthe Freedom 
Houseover the years 1980 and 2003. 
somé others (controls). As a result, there seems to be no causal relationship running from 
these institutions to income. However, this overall effect may hide somé partial effects, and 
this being so, it does not mean that improving freedom-non-compatible institutions would 
not lead to growth: for instance applying less controls given a levél of transfers, or vice 
versa, of course, increases economic freedom, and will cause growth. 
Having said that, the question of what conditions are required for the above to take 
place arises. Our proposition here is that it is the quality of freedom-compatible institutions 
that determines the extent to which freedom-non-compatible institutions can be improved, 
but the whole process can be understood in terms of the theory of interventionism. The 
complexity of the relationships between economic freedom and income is shown in Figure 
2. 
Put simply, both our theory and empirical results suggest that freedom-compatible 
institutions which we think reflect the quality of the rule of law play a crucial role in 
economic freedom: (1) they alone affect long-run income, (2) being exogenous they are 
determined by historical-cultural factors outside the development process, and (3) they alsó 
determine the way and the extent to which the government rely on controls and transfers 
(freedom-non-compatible institutions). 
The above provides us with somé additional insights as regards the relationship between 
economic freedom and its two parts, and development. First, since freedom-compatible 
institutions are to a relatively large extent shaped by various cultural-historical features, 
freedom-non-compatible institutions are much easier to manipulate, and they are 
manipulated by interest groups on the grounds of politics or social welfare considerations. 
Consequently, it is easier to raise the levél of economic freedom by reducing the volume 
of freedom-non-compatible activities than by developing the tools that ensure that the 
government s activities are compatible with the rule of law. 
Second, development works, to somé extent, against economic freedom through the 
interventionist process. Our argument above concerning interventionism implies that the 
expansion of freedom-non-compatible institutions is a side effect of development but better 
freedom-compatible institutions stimulate deregulation. 
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Tables 
Table 1 
Regression results for the economic freedom measure 
1 2 3 4 
Dependent variable: 
ln(GDP) ln(EFM) ln(GDP) ln(GDP) 
OLS OLS 2SLS OLS 
constant 
2.152 
(1.63) 
-0.846 
( -2 .66) b 
2.260 
(1 .86) ' 
2.260 
(1 .73) c 
ln( I /GDP) 1.027 (4.61)" 
-0.040 
(-0.66) 
1.004 
(4 .93 ) ' 
1.004 
(4 .85 ) ' 
In(school) 0.464 (2 .41) b 
0.148 
(2 .49) b 
0.432 
(2 .10) b 
0.432 
(1 .95) ' 
ln(n+g+ő) -1.446 ( -3 .29) ' 
-0.200 
(-1.42) 
-1.495 
(-3.52)" 
-1.495 
(-3.30)" 
ln(EFM) 1.366 (2 .49) b 
1.650 
(3.24)" 
1.650 
(2.97)" 
Share of Catholics 
0.110 
(1 .99) ' 
Share of Protestants 
0.300 
(1 .94) c 
Share o f Jews 
0.099 
(1.12) 
Share of Muslims 
0.250 
(3.71)" 
Share of Hindus 
0.306 
(4.58)" 
Share o f Buddhists 0.403 (3.15)" 
French legal origin 
-0.051 
(-1.11) 
Germán legal origin -0.458 
_ (-0.88) 
Scandinavian legal origin -0.191 ( -2 .46) b 
Transition dummy 
-0.196 
(-3.33)" 
Population -0.348 ( -4 .12) ' 
Residuals from first stage regression 
-0.659 
(-0.69) 
R 2 0.812 0.670 0.811 0.814 
adj. R 2 0.794 0.516 0.790 
N 45 45 45 45 
Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Letters in the upper index refer to significance: a: significance at 
1 percent, b: 5 percent, c: 10 percent. T-values without an index mean that the coefficient is not significant even atthe 10 
percent levél. 
Table 2 
Regression results for the two components of the economic freedom measure 
1 2 3 
Dependent variable: 
ln(GDP) 
OLS OLS 
2SLS 
constant 
4.446 
(2 .61) b 
3.502 
(2 .44) b 
3.418 
(2 .60) a 
ln( I /GDP) 0.853 (4 .23) a 
0.914 
(4 .26) ' 
0.924 
(4 .75) ' 
ln(school) 0.588 (2 .98) a 
0.504 
(2 .61) a 
0.509 
(2 .63) a 
ln(n+g+6) -0.607 (-1.03) 
-1.020 
( -2 .33) b 
-1.028 
( -2 .54) b 
ln(freedom-compatible) 0.799 (3.26)* 
0.781 
(3 .17) a 
0.746 
(3 .38) a 
ln(freedom-non-compatible) -0.879 (-1.24) 
R 2 0.839 0.834 0.834 
adj. R 2 0.818 0.817 
N 45 45 45 
Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Letters in the upper index refer to significance: a: significance at 
1 percent, b: 5 percent. T-values withoutan index mean that the coefficient is not significant even atthe 10 percent levél. 
Table 3 
First stage regression results for, and test for exogeneity of the 
freedom-compatible measure 
1 2 
Dependent variable: 
ln(freedom-compatible) In(GDP) 
OLS 
first stage regression 
OLS 
test for exogeneity 
constant 
-3.409 
( -4 .77) ' 
3.418 
(2 .42 ) b 
ln( I /GDP) 0.0178 (0.14) 
0.924 
(4 .40) a 
ln(shool) 0.247 (1 .93) c 
0.509 
(2 .45) b 
ln(n+g+6) -1.017 (-3 .34) a 
-1.028 
( -2 .35) b 
ln(freedom-compatible) 0.746 (3 .15) ' 
Share of Catholics 
0.300 
(2 .83) ' 
Share o f Protestants 
0.605 
(1.98)" 
Share o f Jews 
0.357 
(1 .94) ' 
Share of Muslims 
0.564 
(3 .50) a 
Share o f Hindus 0.796 (4 .15) a 
Share of Buddhists 
0.658 
(2 .80) a 
French legal origin 
-0.046 
(-0.39) 
Germán legal origin 
0.004 
(0.03) 
Scandinavian legal origin 
-0.287 
(-1.45) 
Transition dummy 
-0.485 
(-4.15)= 
Population -0.761 (-3 .58) a 
Residuals from first stage regression 
0.076 
(0.19) 
R 2 0.702 0.834 
adj. R 2 0.563 0.812 
N 45 45 
Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Letters in the upper index refer to significance: a: significance at 
1 percent, b: 5 percent. T-values withoutan index mean that the coefücient is not significant even atthe 10 percent levél. 
Table 4 
Regression results for the freedom-non-compatible measure 
Dependent variable: 
ln(freedom-non-compatible) 
constant 
0.364 
(1-87) ' 
In(freedom-compatible) 0.084 (1 .88) ' 
ln(initial income) -0.049 ( -2 .28) b 
French legal origin 
-0.080 
( -3 .07) a 
Germán legal origin 
-0.112 
(-3.08)" 
Scandinavian legal origin 
-0.077 
( -1 .97) ' 
Years for the chief executive's party is left-wing 
-0.004 
( -2 .14) ' 
Political rights 
-0.058 
(-0.97) 
R 2 0.514 
Adj. R 2 0.422 
N 45 
Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Letters in the upper index refer to significance: a: significance at 
1 percent, b: 5 percent, c: Í0 percent. T-values withoutan index mean that the coefficient is not significant even atthe 10 
percent levél. 
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Appendix A 
Calculation of and data used for the economic freedom measure (EFM) 
Variable Data Sources of the data Method of calculation 
Economic 
Freedom Measure 
average of the freedom-
compatible and the freedom-
non-compatible measures 
1. Freedom-
non- compatible 
measure 
average of controls, state 
monopoly, and transfers and 
subsidies 
1.1. Controls average of price, quantity, and 
wage 
1.1.1. Price average of the rescaled values 
of price control and weighted 
average tariff rate 
price control Kane et al. (2007) rescaled with 
x i m a x =20 
x!m a x=o 
weighted average tariff rate Kane et al. (2007) rescaled with 
x =55.8 
tmax 
x =0 
1.1.2. Quantity average of the rescaled values 
of the six variables in: trading 
across borders" 
documents for export (number) Doing Business 2007 rescaled with 
x m a i = 1 6 
x
m
"=2 
time for export (days) Doing Business 2007 rescaled with 
x m a x =105 
x " % 3 
cost to export ($ per container) Doing Business 2007 rescaled with 
x. =4300 
imax 
x . =265 
documents for import (number) Doing Business 2007 rescaled with 
x =20 
imax 
x =2 
time for import (days) Doing Business 2007 rescaled with 
x. =139 
imax 
x . =3 
cost to import ($ per container) Doing Business 2007 rescaled with 
x. =4565 
imax 
x. =333 
1.1.3. Wage average of the rescaled values of 
the difficulty of hiring and the 
rigidity of hours indexes 
difficulty of hiring (index) Doing Business 2007 rescaled with 
x m a x = 100 
x"™ = 0 
rigidity of hours (index) Doing Business 2007 rescaled with 
x m ö = 100 
x™ = 0 
1.2. State 
monopoly 
average of the rescaled values of 
the flowing five variables 
revenues from state owned-
enterprises and government 
ownership of property as a percent 
of totál government revenues 
Kane et al. 2007 rescaled with 
x n m x = 100 
x
 m a
 = 0 
imm 
procedures needed to start a 
business (number) 
Doing Business 2007 rescaled with 
x
 m i x = 20 
x'™ = 2 
time needed to start a business 
(days) 
Doing Business 2007 rescaled with 
x =694 
imax 
x = 2 
cost of starting a business (% of 
income per capita) 
Doing Business 2007 rescaled with 
x =1194.5 
imjx 
x. = 0 
minimum capital required to start 
a business (% of income per capita) 
Doing Business 2007 rescaled with 
x =4233.5 
x = 0 
1.3. Transfers and 
subsides 
transfers and subsidies as a share of 
GDP (index) 
Gwartney, J., Lawson, 
R. (2006) 
rescaled with 
ximí = 10 
x™"= 0 
2. Freedom-
compatible 
measure 
average of legal procedures and 
rule-following 
2.1. Legal 
procedures 
average of independent and 
trial 
2.1.1. Independent de facto independence of courts 
(index) 
Feld, L. P„ Voigt, S. 
(2003) 
in originál form 
2.1.2.Trial average ofthe values of the 
following variables 
whether complaints must be legally 
justified 
Djankov, S., La Porta, 
R„ Lopez-de-Silanes, 
F., Shleifer, A. (2003) 
equals 1 if the answer is no, 0 
otherwise 
whether the judgment must 
expressly state the legal justification 
for the decision 
Djankov, S., La Porta, 
R., Lopez-de-Silanes, 
E, Shleifer, A. (2003) 
equals 1 if the answer is yes, 0 
otherwise 
whether the judgment may be 
motivated on generál equity 
grounds, or if it must be founded 
on the law 
Djankov, S., La Porta, 
R., Lopez-de-Silanes, 
E, Shleifer, A. (2003) 
equals 1 if the answer is yes, 0 
otherwise 
whether the judge is forbidden 
by the law to freely request or 
take evidence that has not been 
requested, offered, or introduced 
bv the parties 
Djankov, S., La Porta, 
R., Lopez-de-Silanes, 
F„ Shleifer, A. (2003) 
equals 1 if the answer is no, 0 
otherwise 
whether it is forbidden by the 
law to admit statements of fact 
that were not directly known, or 
perceived by the witness but only 
heard from a third person 
Djankov, S., La Porta, 
R., Lopez-de-Silanes, 
E, Shleifer, A. (2003) 
equals 1 if the answer is no, 0 
otherwise 
whether issues of both law and fact 
(evidence) can be reviewed by the 
appellate court 
Djankov, S., La Porta, 
R., Lopez-de-Silanes, 
E, Shleifer, A. (2003) 
equals 1 if the answer is no, 0 
otherwise 
2.2. Rule-
following -
Corruption 
control of corruption (index) Kaufmann, D. - Kraay, 
A. - Mastruzzi, M. 
(2007) 
rescaled with 
x = 2.574 
imax 
x m m = - 1 . 7 6 7 
Appendix B 
Economic freedom, freedom-compatible and freedom-non-compatible ranks and scores 
for 47 countries 
Source: literature mentioned in Appendix A 
EFM 
rank 
Country EFM score Freedom-non-
compatible 
score 
Freedom-non-
compatible 
rank 
Freedom-
compatible 
score 
Freedom-
compatible 
rank 
1 Australia 0.7862 0.8518 4 0.7205 8 
2 Switzerland 0.7840 0.7913 21 0.7767 2 
3 Singapore 0.7586 0.8811 1 0.6362 15 
4 Japán 0.7577 0.7897 22 0.7257 7 
5 Denmark 0.7553 0.7452 28 0.7654 4 
6 Austria 0.7539 0.6629 40 0.8448 1 
7 Israel 0.7336 0.8073 15 0.6598 10 
8 Sweden 0.7323 0.6909 34 0.7736 3 
9 Georgia 0.7308 0.8790 2 0.5827 23 
10 United States 0.7305 0.8466 6 0.6143 17 
11 Jordán 0.7229 0.8505 5 0.5953 22 
12 Taiwan, China 0.7121 0.7987 17 0.6255 16 
13 South Africa 0.7100 0.8107 12 0.6094 18 
14 Costa Rica 0.7058 0.8102 13 0.6013 20 
15 Francé 0.6971 0.6427 44 0.7515 5 
16 Chile 0.6922 0.8034 16 0.5810 24 
17 Turkey 0.6918 0.8359 9 0.5477 26 
18 Portugál 0.6887 0.7241 29 0.6533 11 
19 Germany 0.6834 0.6334 46 0.7333 6 
20 Estonia 0.6825 0.7617 25 0.6033 19 
21 Netherlands 0.6807 0.7213 31 0.6401 14 
22 Hungary 0.6761 0.7024 33 0.6498 12 
23 Belgium 0.6668 0.6853 36 0.6483 13 
24 India 0.6578 0.7921 19 0.5235 28 
25 Kuwait 0.6550 0.6335 45 0.6764 9 
26 Spain 0.6455 0.7210 32 0.5701 25 
27 Colombia 0.6397 0.7915 20 0.4879 32 
28 Italy 0.6272 0.6552 43 0.5993 21 
29 Botswana 0.6254 0.8083 14 0.4424 35 
30 Lithuania 0.6208 0.7505 27 0.4910 31 
31 Mexico 0.6149 0.7645 24 0.4652 33 
32 Philippines 0.6140 0.8380 8 0.3901 40 
33 Malaysia 0.6102 0.8434 7 0.3771 41 
34 Pakistan 0.5958 0.7978 18 0.3939 39 
35 Croatia 0.5942 0.6568 42 0.5316 27 
36 Argentína 0.5933 0.7871 23 0.3994 38 
37 Guatemala 0.5845 0.8247 10 0.3442 43 
38 Greece 0.5830 0.6674 39 0.4985 30 
39 Slovenia 0.5810 0.6620 41 0.5001 29 
40 Paraguay 0.5789 0.7553 26 0.4025 37 
41 Brazil 0.5715 0.6876 35 0.4555 34 
42 Ecuador 0.5675 0.8135 11 0.3216 44 
43 Kenya 0.5588 0.8571 3 0.2605 47 
44 Czech Republic 0.5415 0.6717 38 0.4114 36 
45 Bulgária 0.5203 0.6844 37 0.3562 42 
46 Russia 0.4987 0.7229 30 0.2745 45 
47 Venezuela 0.4390 0.6118 47 0.2661 46 
